The Guardian

Xi likely to conclude only force keeps him in power

Emma Graham-Harrison

At the end of October Xi Jinping had secured his position as China’s most powerful leader in decades, his grip on the country cemented by a normbreaking third term in office. By the end of November, he was facing the most widespread protests China had seen in decades, mostly focused on Covid restrictions but also featuring unprecedented calls for Xi to step down. It was an extraordinary juxtaposition of political authority and vulnerability within a month, and one that no one inside or outside the country had foreseen.

China’s high-tech surveillance network and punitive laws make anonymous protest almost impossible and the cost of coming out to the streets extremely high.

Security forces equipped with face recognition and other AI

software can comb through footage of protests after the event. They have apparently started turning up at the homes and colleges of some who took part.

Beijing clearly recognised the fury and frustration that drove these public demonstrations, because it has responded with concessions. Across the country, authorities have lifted controls that were deployed with zealous conviction as part of Xi’s personal commitment to zero-Covid.

Chinese citizens have suddenly found they can catch a bus, get on the metro or enter a mall without needing a recent negative PCR test in some cities, while elsewhere those potentially exposed can avoid lockdowns or serve quarantine at home.

This loosening offers only a very temporary solution to the dilemma that China’s leader faces, however. And it is one that his ruthless accumulation of personal power will not help him solve. If Xi allows further easing of controls, China risks being plunged into a devastating national Covid outbreak, that would be likely to claim tens of thousands of lives at best – hundreds of thousands at worst – and temporarily overwhelm a patchy health system.

After nearly three years of isolation from the world and from Covid, China’s population is extremely vulnerable to the disease, with almost no natural immunity. A lacklustre vaccination programme, using domestic vaccines that are not as effective or long-lasting as those developed in the west, has not done enough to bolster those defences.

The government is pushing to address this, but Covid is likely to spread at a rate that outpaces even China’s impressive mobilisation abilities. That could in itself cause

popular resentment. Yet if Xi reverts to heavy-handed attempts to eradicate Covid, the unrest could begin again. It could also be a trigger for anger about other grievances, in a country beset by perhaps the most serious array of political and economic challenges in a generation.

Growth has slowed, against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and Chinese Covid-related isolation. The tech sector has been hamstrung by US chip sanctions. Unemployment has soared, with

one in five young people out of work in cities, while overall the population is ageing fast and may soon start to decline, leaving those young people who do have jobs responsible for supporting a ballooning cohort of retirees.

On top of that, the property sector – into which so many poured their life savings because of a shortage of other investment outlets – is in crisis.

China’s leader has not publicly acknowledged the demonstrations, but reportedly spoke about them in a meeting with the visiting European Council president, Charles Michel, yesterday.

Xi told the European delegation that those who turned out were mostly “frustrated students”, the South China Morning Post reported. He also described the Omicron variant of Covid as less deadly than Delta, which diplomats interpreted as paving the way for further easing.

This may be a sign of confidence. The security apparatus has largely headed off further protests this week, flooding protest sites before crowds can gather and seeking out those who attended last week for intimidation. Xi also has a firm grip on the military, after stacking the top ranks with his loyalists. Ultimately, if a deployment of brute force is required to stay in control, there is no reason to think Xi – who has presided over a campaign of extraordinarily harsh repression in the Xinjiang region – would have any compunction about deploying it, even if he and other leaders would prefer to use other methods.

“Xi and the party will face a lot of headwinds moving forward,” said Steve Tsang, director of the Soas China Institute. “But short of a ‘perfect storm’, the chance is that Xi should be able to keep things under control.

“Xi is trying to use intimidation, actual or implied, to deter people from protesting or organising themselves in way that may pose challenges to the party-state, and then seek to remove some of the sources for such protest. But he also has a backup, which is to use force, at various levels, to repress.”

Neighbouring North Korea, an isolated, impoverished fortress nation, was referenced by some protesters as the future they wanted to avoid. But it may offer a different lesson for China’s leadership – that dictators do not necessarily require a thriving economy or public support to stay in power – not if they have tight control over their country and a monopoly on the use of force.

World

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2022-12-03T08:00:00.0000000Z

2022-12-03T08:00:00.0000000Z

https://guardian.pressreader.com/article/282132115468825

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